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ABSTRACT
Usinga detailed sample of semi-skilled production workers we find that holding a wide
range of personal and job-related characteristics constant, workers assigned to more
complex jobs seem to be more likely to quit than are workers assigned to simpler jobs. Job
complexity has no discernible effect on absenteeism. Matching better educated workers to
more complex jobs affects neither absenteeism nor quit propensity. Thus it appears that
experimental evidence suggesting that job enlargement increases worker satisfaction is
likely to stem from the experimental design: asking for volunteers to be assigned more
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In recent years, there has been a good deal of attention paid to the effects of job
enrichment on labor productivity and job satisfaction. The term job enrichment is used to
describe quite different phenomena including:
(a) changing the production mode from an assembly line to work teams each of
which assembles a complete product,
(b) giving more responsibility to individual workers, e.g. allowing a worker to
stop the assembly line,
(c) increasing the complexity of the task the worker performs.
Some of the productivity improvements claimed from job enrichment are: fewer
defects, less absenteeism, and less turnover of workers.
This paper looks at one form of job enrichment —increasingthe complexity of
manufacturing jobs. I examine the effect of job complexity on the likelihoodof a worker
quitting and on absenteeism.
Although many recent papers extoll job enrichment as means of increasing job
satisfaction and consequently improving worker productivity, reducing quits or improving-2-
the quality of output, the evidence supporting the benefits of job enrichment is not
convincing [see Mitchell Fein, "Job Enrichment Doesn't Work"]. These studies almost
invariably relied on screened volunteers so that only the best and most highly motivated
were assigned to the "enriched" jobs. The experimenters then discovered, not surprisingly,
that the volunteers outperformed the control group.
Two of the most widely cited experiments were conducted by General Foods and
Motorola. In the General Foods experiment 63 participants for the experiment were
selected from 700 applicants. The selection procedure included five screening interviews.
the last interview taking four hours. This experiment seems only to prove that carefully
screened workers are likely to perform better than average workers. At Motorola 22 out of
1,200 workers volunteered to individually assemble pocket pagers.Despite the
experimenters only using volunteers, and choosing a production item carefully selected to
be most amenable to individual assembly, the results in the Motorola experiment were
mixed. Management personnel at the plant reported that individual assembly reduced
inspection and repair costs but required 25% more workers. These effects roughly offset
one another.
James Hackman points out that managers and consultants who initially argued for the
introduction of job enrichment programs are reluctant to report the results of programs
that failed. Hackman finds that job enrichment programs are as likely to fail as succeed,
but that the successful project are disproportionately represented in published studies.
One study that is not vulnerable to Fein's and Hackman's criticisms is Joel Lefkowitz's
investigation of quit rates of sewing machine operators. Lefkowitz obtained a sample of
152 women operators hired at a single plant in 1968 and assigned to jobs of various degrees
of complexity. He found that 20 of the 34 workers assigned to the most difficult jobs quit-3-
within their first 40 work days, while only one of the seven workers assigned to the simplest
jobs quit. These data suggest that job complexity is positively related to quit propensity.
However, Lefkowitz did not adjust for any other demographic characteristics of the
workers, nor did he indicate if the firm randomly assigned workers to jobs of different
degrees of complexity. Another difficulty with the Lefkowitz study is that all the workers
were paid piece-rate. Although the rates varied across jobs, he did not indicate if average
wages differed across jobs. If pay per unit of effort were lower on more complex jobs, this
could account for the observed differences in quit rates.
The study I shall describe also explores the effect of job complexity on quit rates. I
also look at the effect of job complexity on absenteeism as providing another, albeit weaker,
indicator of whether workers prefer more complex or simpler jobs. This study resembles
Lefkowitz's in being retrospective (the results were not the product of an experiment) and
with being concerned with semi-skilled production workers on similar jobs. My study
differs from his in having a much larger sample, roughly equal numbers of men and
women, no significant correlation between wages and job complexity or between
promotional opportunities and job complexity, and in estimating a structural model of the
probability of a worker quitting.
2. THE DATA
The data are for 2,920 semi-skilled electronics assembly workers during their first six
months of employment. For each worker, the available information includes the number of
days the worker was absent, incidents of absenteeism (several consecutive days absent is
counted as one incident) as well as whether or not the worker quit, and the date a quit
occurred. For many of the workers I also obtained data on the complexity of the job the
worker was assigned to, the worker's sex, age, race, years of education, marital status.-4-
whether or not he was employed when he applied to work for the firm, and his score on the
Crawford Physical Dexterity Test.' The workers were hired in either 1977 or 1979 to
perform semi-skilled production work at one of three manufacturing facilities. In each
location all entry level production workers were on the same pay schedule, regardless of the
complexity of the job to which they were assigned, their age, schooling or previous
experience. Workers were assigned randomly to jobs by the personnel office. Job
assignments were independent of worker characteristics. Although all applicants took the
Crawford Physical Dexterity Test, the scores were only used as a hiring criterion: test
scores did not influence job assignments. (This test was almost the sole criterion used in
hiring workers.) Once a worker was hired he received the base rate pay until his
performance exceeded 65%ofexpected output for his job —outputabove that rate was
rewarded according to a nonlinear piece rate schedule. This pay schedule was termed
"early pay." Once 83% of expected output was reached for a fiscal month, the worker was
assigned to a pay group, almost all workers achieved this level within their first 3 months
on the job. All members of a pay group received the same pay, based on the output of the
group. This pay averaged 21% above the base rate. Groups were large, averaging126
participants, and included workers with a wide range of jobs. (In general, pay groups
correspond to product lines.) Within a plant pay differences across groups were trivial.
Finally, a worker on early pay could not earn more than the pay of a member of his
prospective pay group.
Industrial engineers estimated the number of weeks it should take an average worker to
I. Although both men and women were represented in the sample, I use "he" and "his" when referring to a
representative worker. I recognize the sexist implications of those word choices but am not nimble enough
to avoid them without lapsing into especially stilted language.-5-
learneach task to which workers were assigned.I used the logarithm of the training
duration of the job to represent job complexity. Since the aim of the study was to measure
the effect of job enrichment on workers in a particular plant, rather than the impact on the
economy if all firms adopted a job enrichment program, I did not attempt to correctfor
sample selection bias.2
In addition to being exceptionally detailed and well-documented, this data is unique in
other respects. First, we are only considering quits of newly hired workers. Previous
studies that included tenure as a right hand variable suffer from serious simultaneous
equation biases. To see the form this bias takes, let us denote a worker's tenure by t, and
let Qbea variable which is I if the worker quits and zero otherwise. X denotes a vector
of observable variables which affect both iandQ.AssumetX3 + uand
(I) Q=ifX + ty, > whereand M2arerandom variables.
If equation (1) is estimated without correcting for simultaneous equation bias, then
from the tenure relationship independent variables in the quit equation that are correlated
with tenure are also correlated with .Sinceji1and2 are also correlated (unobserved
variables that lead individuals to have more tenure on their job than expected would also
lead them to be less likely to quit) and since all elements of X are likely to be correlated
with tenure, they are also correlated with 2 and their estimated coefficients are biased.
Consequently estimated coefficients of (1) may lead a researcher to conclude that some
2. The sample may not be representative of the population as a whole since we only have data on workers who
both applied to one of the plants and were accepted. On the other hand, the wages and benefits the firm
offered induced long queues of applicants for these jobs. Hiring from that queue was almost random. onl)
229c of the applicants considered were rejected. Approximately 85 of rejections were due to poor scores
on the physical dexterity test. We corrected for that source of bias in the analysis.-6-
traitis positively (negatively) correlated with quit propensity when its true correlation is
negative (positive). Because the same characteristics affect both tenure and quit
propensity, a system of equations that estimated both sets of coefficients simultaneously or
through an instrumental variable procedure would only be identified through differences in
the functional form of the two relationships. To the extent that unobserved variables that
affect absenteeism affect tenure (workers who are often absent will be more likely to be
fired and hence will have less tenure) these simultaneous equation biases also arise when
attendance is the dependent variable. By restricting the study to newly-hired workers,
simultaneous equation biases arising from tenure differences are avoided.
Unfortunately, simultaneous equation bias persists to the extent that other variables.
such as age, are correlated with the error term in the quit equation. This bias arises since
older workers who are taking a new job are less representative of their age cohort than are
younger workers who are taking a new job. Consequently, age is likely to be negatively
correlated with the error term in the quit equation causing the estimated coefficient on age
to be biased upward: older workers who are starting a new job are likely to have
unobserved attributes that increase their quit propensity. The coefficients of variables that
are correlated with age are also biased. However, this bias is likely to be small relative to
the bias introduced by tenure differences. In addition, because workers are assigned
randomly to jobs, any correlation between independent variables in the selection equation
and job complexity would be due solely to chance. In the plants being studied, job
assignments are made by the personnel office strictly by ranking applicants who have
satisfied the hiring criteria (achieved acceptable scores on the dexterity test) in the order in
which they applied for work and then assigning them to the available jobs in that order: the
thapplicant(who passes the dexterity test) gets the thavailablejob. Similarly, job
transfers are made strictly by seniority. This automatic assignment procedure is done in-7-
order to avoid job discrimination suits or union grievances. The plants are unionized and
the unions closely monitor job assignments. The random assignment of individuals to jobs
removes another potential source of bias. If job assignments were made on the basis of
attributes for which we do not have data, but which are correlated with either absenteeism
or quit propensity, our estimated coefficients would be biased.
3. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Perhaps the best measure of job satisfaction is whether or not the worker quit [see
Nicholson, Brown and Chadwick-Jones]. Since the lifetime earnings for all the workers in
our samples would be the same if they did not change jobs, and is independent of job
complexity, it seems likely that quit propensity is negatively related to job satisfaction.
Consequently, I used quit propensity as a proxy for job dissatisfaction. I estimated the
effect of job complexity upon quit rates using a probit model.3
A worker quits if and only if
u(AO)—M>U(PJ) (i)
where U(AO) represent the utility derived from some alternative job offer, u(Pi)
represents the utility derived from the worker's present job, M denotes mobility costs.
Let U(AO) and L/(PJ) each be functions of observed characteristics of the person or
the job, denoted by X, and error terms, ii,,whichcapture unobserved job or person related
characteristics.
3. Workers who were laid off before completing their first six months on the job were excluded from the
sample as were all workers who were hired after any worker who was laid off —eachof those workers
would have been laid off if they had not quit. Layoffs are determined solely by seniority.-8-
uCiO) =f(X131)+ (2)
u(PJ)g(X2fl2) + n, (3)
Thus a worker quits his job if and only if
f(x11) —g(X2fl2) —M >'?2fli (4)
fl2 —N(O,o2)
I assume that workers are risk neutral, have fixed retirement ages, and that holding age
fixed employed women expect to work 25% fewer hours than employed men.Ilet
f (A'1, fly) and g(X2, 132) have the same functional form
(65—age) (I —.25 female)
— e' X,13,dt . (5)
p incorporates both the time preferencesof workers, and their projected growth of real
wages. Hence if workers discount the future by an amount greaterthan their anticipated
growth of real wages pispositive. I estimated the quit equation below using values of
p= +.05and p =—.05.
Because we are interested in the effect of job complexity on job satisfaction, job
complexity is included as an element of X. Integrating (5) and substitutinginto (4), a
worker quits his job if and only if
[h (age, sex) 11X3 133] —M>n
e1 —.25femalel[65—age]
where h (age, sex)
—p
={X1,X2) and includes education, age, race, sex, whether the worker was employed
when be applied for the job question, and scores on each section of the Crawford Physical
Dexterity Test, as well job complexity. I also included a term measuring theinteraction of-.9-
job complexity and education. The interaction effect was calculated as [In (training
duration) —mean(in (training duration))] times [education —mean(education)], where
the means were calculated separately for each location. This interaction term captures the
effect on job satisfaction of matching the better educated workers to the more complex
jobs. Although the results reproduced below are derived from equations which included
these interaction effects, omitting the interaction effects did not significantly affect the
coefficients on the logarithm of job complexity in the various behavioral equations.
Data was available on all these independent variables for 1532 newly-hired workers at
two locations, one in the midwest the other in the south. At the third location considerable
data was missing and promotional opportunities were correlated with job assignments.
Hence we omitted that data in studying quit rates. The median training duration of the
jobs to which workers were assigned was seven weeks. The elements of M included
marital status, and education.
The other independent variables included in the estimates of the probability of a worker
quitting were high school graduation, college graduation, marital status, and education. as
well as h (age, sex) times : education, age, sex, race, plant locations, whether the worker
was employed when he applied to work at the plant, and scores on the physical dexterity
test. In the southern location whites were more likely to quit than non-whites (a i'
statisticof 4.25 for p= —.05)and workers who were employed when they applied for these
jobs and high school graduates were each less likely to quit ("t"statisticsof -4.45 and -1.97
respectively for p= —.05).None of the other independent variables were statistically
significant.- 10-
Insert Table 1 about here
To gain some intuition about the economic significance of these results for p= —.05;a
one standard deviation increases in h (')xLn (training required) increases the probability
of a worker quitting within the first 6 months on these jobs by 2.2% when all independent
variables are assigned their mean values. Since only 12.27% of the workers in the sample
quit within their first six months on the job, this is an economically as well as statistically
significant result.
Before concluding from these observations that increasing job complexity decreases job
satisfaction 1 investigated the partial correlation between job complexity and absenteeism.
The reported linkages between absenteeism and job satisfaction is weaker than between
quits and job satisfaction. Consequently, I did not expect to find a strong relationship
between absenteeism and job complexity. The investigation of the relationship between
absenteeism and job complexity was a check on the earlier results. A significant positive
correlation would cost considerable doubt on the conclusion from the study of quit rates—
that workers dislike more complex jobs.
Absenteeism was measured in two ways: incidents of absenteeism and days absent.
Regardless of the measure used the effect of job complexity on absenteeism was not
statistically significant. Because there are few large studies of absenteeism I have listed
the estimated coefficients of all the independent variables. (For the estimates listed below
data from all three locations was used, the results were not significantly altered if the third
plant was omitted).
In estimating the effect of job complexity and the interaction between education and job- 11-
complexityon occasions absent I used the negative binomial procedure described in
Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1981). This procedure assumes that the occasions of
absenteeism for each individual is generated by a Poisson arrival process. The individual
specific parameters A. are assumed to have a gamma distribution across the population. I
assumed A was a linear function of job complexity (the logarithm of the number of weeks
required to learn the assigned job) and the interaction of education and job complexity as
well as age, sex, race, geographic location, previous employment status, education, high
school graduation, college graduation, scores on the dexterity test. The sample was limited
to people who worked for the firm for at least six months.
Insert Table 2 about here
I used the same independent variable to estimate the percentage of days a worker was
absent during his first six months on the job. Those observations were weighted by the
square root of the number of days worked, and a Tobit estimation procedure was used.
Insert Table 3 about here
As can be seen, job complexity seems uncorrelated with occasions absent and is either
uncorrelated or negatively correlated with the percentage of days absent. This evidence
supports our tentative conclusion from the data on quits: job satisfaction is not greater on
more complex jobs.- 12-
4. CONCLUSION
The evidence we have presented suggests that if job enrichment takes the form of
increasing the complexity of semi-skilled production jobs (job enlargement), the job
satisfaction of workers is likely to fall. The principal measure of job satisfaction used was
quit propensity. This empirical evidence accords with the casual observation that job
enrichment programs are invariably initiated by management not by workers or unions.
The data presented contradicts various experimental findings. However, those experiments
relied on volunteers —itis not surprising that while randomly selected workers seem to
prefer simpler jobs, workers who ask to be reassigned to more complex jobs prefer the jobs
they requested.REFERENCES
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737.TABLE 1
Effect of Job Complexity on Quit
Rates Within 1st Six Months on the Job
("t" statistics in Parentheses)
p——.05 p=.05
in Quit Rate in Quit Rate
Coefficientat Quit Rate =.10Coefficientat Quit Rate =.10
Ln (Training Reqd.) .00973 .027 .0015 .0267
(2.31) (2.64)
Interaction between Education -.0038 -.012 -.0068 .012
and Ln(Training Reqd.) (-1.21) (-1.52)
Proportion of Quits within 6 months .123
Number of Observations 1532
Log likelihood -525.18 -530.34
*Dataon race was not available for the southwest location.TABLE 2
Occasions Absent in 1st Six Months on the Job
Negatiie Binomial Estimation Procedure
(":"statisticsin parentheses)
Coefficient
Ln(Training Reqd) -.00 106
(-.028)
Interaction between Education .011







White x South .535
(5.51)




















Number of Observations 1565
Log Likelihood -1333.51
Mean Occasions Absent 1 .41TABLE 3
Percentage of Days Absent in 1st Six
Months on the Job*
("t" statistics below coefficient)
Effect of a one
standard deviation
change on the percentage
Variable Coefficient of days absent**
Ln(Training Reqd) -.197 -.13
(.97)
Interaction between -.079 -.06





















Dexterity Test Score -.013
(-.47)




Number of Observations 1840
*Thecoefficients were estimated using a tobit estimation procedure-each observation was weighted by the
square root of the number of days worked. The mean value of percentage of days absent was 2.71.
**Thecomputations in the third column are the effects of changes in the independent variables (not
multiplied by the weighing factor) on the percentage of days absent.